Overview:
On May 8th, 2018, the Trump administration unilaterally withdrew from The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The deal was the most significant remnant of the Obama administration’s security Policy. The JCPOA was accepted by Iran on July 14th, 2015 with support from China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany, also known as the P5+1. The JCPOA set stringent limits on the amount of highly enriched Uranium (HEU), the number of centrifuges Iran can have active at any time, and the handling of all enrichment byproducts, for at least the next 10-15 years [1]. Strict verification by the IAEA allowed the P5 +1 to independently review Iran’s commitment to the deal through continual review of all limitations. In return for unfettered access to Iran’s nuclear supply chain, the P5+1 agreed to lift all economic sanctions and allow access to $100 billion of previously frozen assets[2].
The Trump administration’s withdrawal from the JCPOA was immediately followed by a campaign of “maximum pressure”. Severe economic sanctions and targeted killings of influential figures such as Gen. Qasem Soleimani and Mohsen Fakhrizadeh were followed by a call to other P5+1 members to snapback sanctions in an effort to effectively topple the Iranian regime[3]. In retaliation, Iran has exponentially increased its stockpile of HEU, significantly reducing the amount of time necessary to manufacture a nuclear warhead[4]. The Biden administration is now left to determine whether the JCPOA is the right course of action in preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon in the short-term and long-run.
After the aggressive actions taken by the Trump administration, Iran is in no position to concede anything further. From their perspective, the United States broke the JCPOA and attempted to cripple the country’s economy without any sufficient cause. Based on their previous responses to U.S. aggression, it can be assumed that Iranians would support retaliatory measures against the United States. This may come in the form of increased support of militant terrorist groups throughout the Middle East, the production of nuclear warheads, or other risks to the security of America and its allies. With Iranian elections being held in June of this year, the Biden administration must prepare contingency plans for a hostile Iranian government seeking vengeance and/or reparations.
This constitutes risk for both American security concerns in the Middle East, such as the protection of allies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, as well as avoiding a nuclear arms race in the region. A more hostile Iranian government will likely increase its support of militias such as Hezbollah and Hamas[5]. Funneling funds, armaments, and intelligence to these organizations poses a threat to American forces and personnel on the ground, allies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, and the local populations of the Middle East. The protracted religious-based conflicts of the region can and will become worse if Iran is not dealt with. This is especially true if the status quo persists and Iran continues its enrichment processes to a level where a nuclear arsenal is plausible. If the Biden administration were to re-engage with Iranian leadership either through JCPOA talks or political back channels, such security risks may be diminished.
Iran also poses a security risk domestically. Its increasingly sophisticated cyber warfare arsenal poses a significant threat to both the U.S. government and its citizens[6]. Recent Russian success in long-term American cyber-attacks targeting the U.S. departments of Treasury, Commerce and Homeland Security increases the risk to American intelligence of a similar cyber-attack from Iran, as it indicates that U.S. cyberdefense is lacking[7]. This is especially concerning when considering Iran’s rapidly improving offensive cyber capabilities and its ability to mobilize the talent of its university students for cyber warfare through its Basij program[8]. The damage done in such a case would be indiscriminate, affecting the livelihoods of millions of innocent American citizens regardless of background. This would also risk the joint efforts of the State Department, Department of Defense, and intelligence communities of advancing U.S. interests abroad by affecting their ability to conduct foreign policy and maintain stability throughout the region. Depending on the level of Iranian hostility, security risks may come in the form of classified information ending up in our enemies’ possession or physical harm of policy makers/military personnel. If left unfettered, Iran may take full advantage of our domestic weaknesses and division.
From a security perspective, Iran’s nuclear program has created a number of threats to U.S. national security interests both at home and abroad. Thus, the Biden administration must act quickly and decisively in its attempt to placate Iranian retaliation. However, prior to recommending potential policy options, the political consequences of the Iranian nuclear program and the JCPOA must be assessed.
Political Background:
The JCPOA has been controversial both domestically and internationally. Domestically, disagreement on the deal has stemmed from ideological differences on what the objectives of a deal with Iran should entail. Critics view the JCPOA as failing to fulfill the goal of neutralizing both the nuclear and conventional threat of Iran and its proxies throughout the Middle East[9]. Supporters view the JCPOA as successfully fulfilling its goal of guaranteeing a non-nuclear Iran, and believe Iran’s conventional capabilities and proxies should be dealt with separately[10].
The most contested issues are those of the length of the restrictions and sanction relief fund expenditures. Critics believe that the 10-15-year limits on enrichment set by the JCPOA simply delay Iran’s timeline for creating a nuclear weapon, rather than guarantee a non-nuclear Iran[11]. Critics also maintain that unrestricted sanctions relief has bankrolled Iran’s terrorist proxies and allowed them to develop ballistic missiles for nuclear warheads[12].
Supporters of the JCPOA argue that 10-15-year limits were necessary to keep negotiations diplomatically realistic, as well as incentivize future negotiations between Iran and the P5+1[13]. From the supporter’s perspective, having Iran permanently forswear nuclear weapons would either require regime change, war, or an impossible amount of political capital that the P5+1 could not realistically offer. Additionally, supporters believe that sanctions relief alongside the threat of sanctions snapback would incentivize peaceful Iranian behavior in the regime.
Internationally, the greatest controversy is determining how the Biden administration will deal with re-engaging Iran. The P5 +1 have dedicated significant diplomatic effort to the JCPOA and would hope for an immediate U.S. re-entry into the JCPOA. This may entail U.S. compliance occurring first in the form of retracting economic sanctions. This would apply pressure on Iran to reduce its enrichment activities as failing to match U.S. compliance would allow the P5+1 to snap back coordinated economic sanctions. Overall, the consensus among the remaining P5+1 members is to take the quickest diplomatic route to guaranteeing a non-nuclear Iran in order to minimize the risk of the JCPOA completely collapsing, as exemplified by their diplomatic efforts in the current negotiations in Vienna[14].
However, Middle Eastern allies of the U.S. that were frozen out of the original JCPOA negotiations, specifically Saudi Arabia and Israel, see an opportunity to intervene. Saudi Arabia and Israel have both continually called for a stronger U.S. stance on Iran than the JCPOA to bolster their own security. Thus, pressure by these U.S. allies may result in a harder line on Iran, threatening them with continued sanctions and pressure until they fall under compliance first. Further consultation with Middle Eastern allies may also potentially lead to renegotiations of an expanded JCPOA that includes Saudi Arabia and Israel[15].
As of now, the Biden administration has indicated that it would not unilaterally fall into compliance immediately but will aim for a compliance-for-compliance strategy that would eventually result in both states complying with the JCPOA. In essence, a compliance-for-compliance strategy would entail a simultaneous, step-wise process in which the U.S. would partially lift economic sanctions while Iran partially reduces its enrichment processes with corroboration from the IAEA. After several partial reductions, both parties would eventually conform with the original measures under the JCPOA.
The differing views of the JCPOA stem from uncertainty over Iran’s goals in the region. Typically, critics of the JCPOA have pointed towards historical Iranian aggressions towards U.S. interests and allies in the Middle East as proof that Iran hopes to achieve hegemony in the region. Supporters are less likely to view Iran as attempting to form hegemony in the Middle East, but rather view Iranian behavior as a flawed means of security. Supporters are also more likely to understand Iranian grievances with America’s aggressive foreign policy. The most significant events in the shaping of these perspectives on Iran have been the 1953 Iranian Coup, the Iranian revolution of the late 1970s, the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis, and George Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address[16].
Supporters are more likely to view the 1953 CIA-led Iranian coup, American support of the Iranian monarchy during the Iranian revolution, and Bush’s inclusion of Iran in his “Axis of Evil” as antagonistic foreign policies that were bound to result in an Iranian response. Thus, Iranian hostilities towards the U.S. and its allies in the Middle East are more likely to be understood by supporters as a sign of retaliation, rather than an attempt at hegemony. However, supporters do see Iranian proxies as a significant issue in the region, but one that is less concerning than that of nuclear weapons.
Critics’ views on Iran are more shaped by the 1979 Iran hostage crisis and Iran’s continuous proxy wars. In both cases, critics of the JCPOA would point out Iran’s hostility towards America and its Middle Eastern allies as being unjustified. Subsequently, Iranian threats of nuclear and conventional war against Israel and other American interests are thus taken more seriously by critics.
Politically, the upcoming 2021 Iranian Presidential election has added to the controversy. Although the Biden administration has made clear that it plans on negotiating a U.S. re-entry to the JCPOA with Iran, new Iranian leadership may not cooperate. The Iranian presidential election is slated for June 18th with candidates being selected by the Guardian council[17]. Many believe that the Guardian Council will present the public with candidates further to the right due to the actions of the Trump administration. A right-wing hardliner would significantly complicate a U.S. reentry by requiring significant U.S. concessions to comply with the JCPOA as restitution for unjustified American sanctions and attacks[18]. This would be in stark contrast to the actions and goals of current Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, who has actively supported the current negotiations in Vienna and was president when the JCPOA was originally signed[19]. In order to circumvent this possibility, the Biden administration has started indirect negotiations with the current Iranian administration in Vienna this week to try and rush through a last-minute “compliance-for-compliance” agreement[20]. However, political backlash domestically for both administrations may derail any potential progress. Domestic critics view Trump-era sanctions as significant leverage that Biden would be unwisely giving up, whereas Iranian domestic critics view any negotiation with the U.S. as futile with elections so soon[21],[22].
The U.S. exit of the JCPOA has now also invited complications by Middle Eastern states. Saudi Arabian leadership has recently indicated that they expect to be consulted, along with other Gulf state allies, by the U.S. regarding their potential re-entry to the JCPOA, in order to create a more sustainable agreement[23]. These additional actors, namely Saudi Arabia and Israel, will likely lobby the U.S. to take a harder stance on Iran in order to preserve their own security concerns. Although consultation may still result in a compliance-for-compliance strategy, the amount of time any U.S. re-entry negotiation would take would be increased, making it very difficult for a deal to be reached before the Iranian elections in June.
A lengthier timetable also allows U.S. allied critics of the JCPOA to sabotage the negotiations. This can be seen through the recent skirmishes between Israel and Iran in the Mediterranean and Red Seas[24]. Israel’s attacks on Iranian ships will likely push Iran further away from the negotiating table, as Iran views Israel as a proxy for U.S. domination in the Middle East[25]. This may also sabotage U.S. re-entry by incentivizing Iran to request even more concessions from the U.S. before reaching compliance in any U.S. re-entry agreement. Sabotage of JCPOA negotiations would allow Israel to try and push the U.S. towards a more hostile stance on Iran, whether through an expanded JCPOA including U.S. Middle Eastern allies or through military might.
Although Middle Eastern allies may interfere, the parties with the most control over the outcome of negotiations are still the U.S. and Iran. The Biden administration’s optimal goal of “compliance-for-compliance” has been made explicit, however, the administration could leverage its sanctions in order to maintain greater influence over Iran. With Iran’s economy devastated by a combination of American sanctions and the Coronavirus pandemic, continued American sanctions would give the Biden administration significant leverage in negotiations.
It could be argued that the next Iranian President holds the most control over the U.S. re-entry to the JCPOA, as the Biden administration has explicitly committed to negotiations. A moderate Iranian President may decide that negotiations are necessary to relieve economic pressure and cooperate[26]. However, a vengeful right-wing Iranian President may increase its (Highly Enriched Uranium) HEU production and significantly shorten the time needed to obtain a nuclear weapon, which would be disastrous for the U.S. and its allies. Thus, Iran’s control over the outcome is derived from its unpredictability rather than its capabilities, whereas U.S. control stems from its leverage of economic sanctions.
The United States could play a more significant role in ameliorating the controversy if it is able to maintain greater control of its allies. The Biden administration must make it clear to Israel and Saudi Arabia that sabotage of negotiations will not be tolerated, as it could jeopardize U.S control over the situation. It is most likely that the Biden administration will consult with its Middle Eastern allies to gain a better understanding of their security concerns, but will prioritize reaching a re-entry agreement with Iran. As the majority of the burden falls on Iran, it will be difficult for the Biden administration to make matters worse, as long as it keeps its aims limited. If the Biden administration is too adamant on Iranian compliance prior to U.S. compliance, conflict may be likely. However, the Biden administration will likely attempt to keep its aims limited and the situation stable. Following this approach would result in a successful re-entry into the JCPOA, as long as the Biden administration does not become too desperate or attempts to overplay its leverage in sanctions.
Policy Recommendation:
Given these circumstances, it is clear that the United States and Iran are the only parties equipped to resolve this issue. The remaining P5+1 parties may play a minor role in resolving the issue by continuing to attend current negotiations in Vienna, however, they will not be making the final decision on any potential resolution. Thus, I would recommend that the United States continue negotiations with Iran in the hopes of achieving a compliance-for-compliance strategy predicated on either America acting first or simultaneous steps.
An American first step of lifting sanctions would be most beneficial as it would best convey the Biden administration’s intentions due to the recent Israeli blackout of Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility[27]. Although America’s role in the blackout remains unclear, Iran views Israel as a proxy for America, just as America views Hezbollah and other groups as proxies of Iran. Thus, the blackout has significantly damaged the possibility of Iran moving first by once again punishing Iran unprovoked. Although Iran did announce that it would be enriching Uranium up to 60%, such enrichment would not produce a nuclear weapon and was accompanied by inspections from the IAEA[28].
Combining this action with the fact that the Trump administration pulled out from the JCPOA and applied significant sanctions on Iran unprovoked, the Biden administration must make it clear that it wants a peaceful, long-term, stable, resolution. Pressing for Iran to concede first would risk further distrust of America in Iran. This would stifle Iranian re-entry to the JCPOA both with the current Iranian administration and would likely increase domestic support for right wing candidates in the Iranian election. Thus, even lifting a quarter or half of the economic sanctions placed on Iran first would benefit the Biden administration in the long run if its goal is a peaceful re-entry into the JCPOA.
However, simultaneous steps towards compliance is likely the more realistic outcome as it does not cost the Biden administration as much political capital domestically. This would satiate lawmakers and citizens who believe that the United States should not give up the leverage of sanctions, which would be consistent with Biden’s promise to be a bipartisan president[29],[30].
A recommendation on behalf of Iran is difficult due to the uncertainty surrounding the next Iranian administration. However, I would recommend the current administration to continue negotiations in Vienna with the hopes of a rapid re-entry in the hopes that America complies first in some manner. This may make it more difficult for the next Iranian administration to exit the JCPOA and would put Iran at a significant disadvantage in future negotiations if the next administration were to pull out. This could disincentivize a future right-wing administration from pulling out. It is also possible that a quick agreement in which America partially complies first would could result in greater domestic support for the JCPOA, both from the standpoint of stability and economics. This can be shown through recent polling, which indicates that roughly 70% of Iranian citizens support re-entering the JCPOA if the United States were to comply first[31].
However, the current Iranian administration must act quick and must not stifle negotiations in the hope of immediate unilateral American compliance. For one, if an agreement on re-entry is not confirmed by the time of the Iranian election, it is possible that the next administration will not continue with negotiations and will instead continue to enrich Uranium near or at weapons grade quality. It must also be understood that although the Biden administration has made it clear that it hopes to re-enter the JCPOA peacefully, tensions between America and its Middle Eastern allies are significant and must be considered. Israel has already taken severe actions against Iran due to the start of the Vienna negotiations and hope that neither side re-enters into compliance. Pushing too hard for American concessions only plays into Israel and Saudi Arabia’s hand and risks Iranian security in the future. If the next Iranian administration continues with increased Uranium enrichment and rejects re-entry into the JCPOA, Iran would likely have to prepare to deal with security threats from Israel, Saudi Arabia, and possibly the United States. Thus, it is in Iran’s best interest to come to a swift agreement on re-entry. These risks are not worth the shallow benefits of having America completely fall into compliance first.
However, Iran should push to at least have America partake in simultaneous steps, as it would be popular domestically and ensure that the Biden administration is genuine in its intentions. This could be achieved by working closely with the other P5+1 powers, who all went against the Trump administration’s decision to exit the JCPOA and share the Iranian’s grievances about American trustworthiness for a number of reasons[32].
The likelihood of this outcome is dependent on the success of the Vienna negotiations. The quick launch of the negotiations before the Iranian election was a significant step towards progress and was far from guaranteed. Recent Israeli actions do threaten to elongate the negotiations and risk a rapid re-entry from Iran, but have yet to deter Iran from coming to the table in Vienna. This is a sign that Iran is as willing to rejoin as the United States, which bodes well for this plan. However, recent news reports from the Vienna negotiations indicate that the sides are far from a resolution, so a deal before June may not be possible[33]. However, these reports also indicate that simultaneous steps toward compliance are the most likely outcome of the negotiations[34].
Overall, the issue of whether or not the United States should re-enter the JCPOA with Iran is more a question of “how quickly” rather than “if at all”. The Biden administration’s goals have been explicit, the rest of the P5+1 have been supportive, Iran is at the table running out of time, and the world awaits. The United States must re-enter the JCPOA and must do so quickly. If not, American allies in the Middle East will double down on their goal of unhinging Iran and risk creating a security dilemma with the next Iranian administration that the Biden administration neither has the intention or resources of dealing with. Therefore, the United States and Iran must rapidly capitalize on this rare opportunity to establish long- lasting peace and stability.
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[20] “US Sets ‘compliance for Compliance’ as Rule for Returning to Iran Nuclear Deal,” The National, March 3, 2021, https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/the-americas/us-sets-compliance-for-compliance-as-rule-for-returning-to-iran-nuclear-deal-1.1177128. [21] Ian Swanson, “Senate Republicans Voice Opposition to Biden on Iran,” Text, TheHill, April 7, 2021, https://thehill.com/policy/international/546905-senate-republicans-voices-opposition-to-biden-on-iran. [22] “Iran Warns Election Delays Could Slow Nuclear Deal Moves,” AP NEWS, March 15, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/iran-iran-nuclear-middle-east-tehran-international-agreements-5841f3f747f7e106cfe94f804ace555f. [23] Agence France-Presse, “Iran Nuclear Deal: Saudi Arabia Says Gulf States Must Be Consulted If US Revives Accord,” the Guardian, December 6, 2020, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/06/iran-nuclear-deal-saudi-arabia-says-gulf-states-must-be-consulted-if-us-revives-accord. 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