Decision Brief
Issue Summary:
The U.S. withdrew from the Intermediate Nuclear forces (INF) treaty on 1 February 2019. This was due to continuous Russian testing of the SSC 8 IRM and changing security circumstances in Asia. Regional nuclear powers all own an IRM (intermediate-range missile) arsenal and Russian testing of the SSC-8 indicates potential proliferation. China has recently proliferated its IRM arsenal significantly and poses a security threat to the U.S., Russia, and the international system. This paper will propose policy options to address the imbalance between the IRM capabilities of Russia and China compared to the U.S.
Options:
The U.S. counteracts with its own proliferation. Russian SSC-8 IRM testing and Chinese IRM proliferation should be matched by American IRM proliferation and deployment. Immediate deployment would also increase U.S. leverage in future IRM arms control agreements.
The U.S. negotiates bilateral IRM treaties with Russia and China separately. The U.S. has different relationships and priorities with each state that are better addressed bilaterally. Verification processes would likely follow the original INF treaty.
The U.S. negotiates a multilateral IRM treaty including Russia and China that would set a consistent standard for IRMs. Includes verification processes with inspectors from all parties, similar to that of the original INF treaty.
Recommendation:
The Biden administration should prepare to engage in a multilateral negotiation with Russia and China. Elimination/restriction of IRMs applicable to all parties would be the most simple and effective form of arms control.
Introduction:
From 1987 to 2019, the INF successfully eliminated 2,692 U.S. and Russian intermediate-range missiles (IRMs). The INF treaty was the first to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons and introduced on-site inspection and verification processes. The INF avoided nuclear war with Russia and de-escalated the nuclear arms race [1]. However, it failed to account for security issues presented by future nuclear powers in the region. China’s massive IRM proliferation has created a significant security threat on Russia’s southern border [2],[3]. This likely contributed to recent Russian testing of the SSC-8 IRM, a clear violation of the INF treaty [4]. Although the Russians deny this, the U.S. and Russia acknowledge other IRM nuclear powers must be addressed. In 2007, they both urged states to renounce IRMs at the United Nations General Assembly [5]. Though this move failed, it indicated the U.S. goal of IRM disarmament and Russia’s willingness to follow.
Chinese proliferation and Russian testing risks destabilizing the international system and threatens U.S. security interests in the region. The withdrawal on 1 February 2019 hinted at U.S. IRM deployment for Trump’s assumed second term. Since the U.S. withdrawal, Chinese security threats of IRM proliferation have increased. It is estimated that China possesses 2,200+ dual-capable IRMs that would have been eliminated under the INF treaty, constituting 95% of its ballistic and cruise missile arsenal [6]. Chinese proliferation would exacerbate Russian and American security issues. The Biden administration would need to act immediately.
Policy Recommendation #1:
Recommendation:
The U.S. could continue with individual proliferation.
Pro:
Since the U.S. withdrawal, the Trump administration has asserted that U.S. proliferation is necessary. The Department of Defense requested $100 million for the development and deployment of IRMs that would have violated the INF treaty[7]. This policy would allow greater U.S. autonomy over its security. Previous agreements protected the U.S. from the Russian threat, but the rise of China has not been addressed. Proliferation would benefit U.S. autonomy and pressure Russia and China to either renegotiate or face massive IRM deployment.
The U.S. would likely deploy dual-capable IRMs to counter Russia’s dual capabilities [8],[9]. Dual capable IRM proliferation would support Mutually Assured Destruction (M.A.D.) and would increase U.S. nuclear strength. This would increase the effectiveness of first and second-strike capabilities. This could enhance nuclear deterrence with Russia and China., creating a more stable security environment within the region [10],[11]. Proliferation would also demonstrate U.S. dedication to its allies’ security. Many Russian and Chinese IRMs are in the range of U.S. allies that rely on the American nuclear umbrella. U.S. IRM proliferation would assuage threats posed by Russian and Chinese IRMs.
Proliferation without IRM deployment is also possible. Manufacturing IRMs without deployment may increase U.S. leverage in future arms control negotiations. Testing and manufacturing of IRMs would indicate U.S. willingness to both negotiate arms control agreements and take military action if needed. Proliferation without deployment would allow for the U.S. to take a stronger stance on deployed Russian and Chinese IRMs during future arms control agreements This would resemble the U.S./NATO double-track approach prior to signing the original INF treaty with the U.S.S.R. [12].
Con:
U.S. proliferation may also exacerbate the security situation and instigate a nuclear arms race. The original INF treaty was pivotal in slowing the nuclear arms race [13]. U.S. proliferation would be too expensive to undertake. Research and testing cost $100 million for preliminary steps and an additional $900 million through 2024 [14]. However, proliferation may also cause Chinese and Russian proliferation, increasing tensions between nuclear powers. An unnecessary raise in tension may increase the potential for political and military missteps, potentially leading to conventional or nuclear conflict. The current relationship between the U.S. and China and Russia is already significantly strained and further strain may reach a breaking point.
U.S. proliferation may also cause instability in U.S. alliances. U.S. allies could oppose support for IRMs, fearing security implications. U.S. allies would not want to be Russian or Chinese military targets if conflict were to occur. This problem was one of the foundations of the original INF treaty, thus it must be accounted for in this context. A double-track approach runs the risk of conflict but assumes it will not occur due to nuclear deterrence. The dual capability of present IRMs would unnecessarily increase the risk of conventional conflict even with nuclear deterrence.
Policy Recommendation #2:
Recommendation:
The U.S. negotiates several IRM treaties.
Pro:
Negotiation of separate IRM treaties with Russia and China would benefit U.S diplomatic efforts. The U.S. could leverage oil and state bank sanctions relief with Russia from the Crimean annexation. U.S. negotiations with China could focus on agricultural trade deals and intellectual property disputes. Using U.S. economic and diplomatic leverage in these cases would alleviate the economic burden of a nuclear arms race. It would also decrease the possibility of conventional or nuclear conflict.
Negotiating separate bilateral IRM control agreements would also allow the U.S. to adopt a middleman strategy and initiate negotiations with China and Russia. The guarantee of IRM de-escalation could incentivize Russia and China to negotiate. The risk of U.S. proliferation may be too great for either state to risk, and thus bilateral cooperation may occur. These bilateral IRM agreements would follow the same inspection processes as the original INF agreement, with rigorous on-site inspections. However, these agreements may not impose a ban on all IRM missiles, and may only restrict IRMs to certain amounts in strategic locations. These agreements would give the U.S. flexibility in changing security circumstances. This option would also be the least strenuous for the U.S. It is consistent with previous arms control and diplomatic efforts. It also aligns with the State and Defense departments which tend to look for bilateral agreements.
Con:
Bilateral IRM agreements could also incentivize problematic behaviors. Lifting sanctions on Russian oil or allowing Chinese intellectual property violations to continue in exchange for an IRM agreement may encourage these rogue behaviors in the future. This may indicate that rogue state behavior can be tolerated for security benefits, which was an issue the U.S. faced in the early 2000s [15]. Rogue state behavior is also encouraged if it is ignored during negotiations. If rogue state behaviors such as Uighur internment and Crimean annexation are ignored during bilateral negotiations, security threats would not have been adequately addressed. Equivalence in IRM capabilities may be outweighed by further instability caused by rogue state behaviors that are not considered during negotiations.
IRM agreements risk having inconsistencies if not negotiated in tandem with each other. These inconsistencies may be viewed as exhibiting favoritism, threatening the durability of such agreements [16]. Such negotiations would also require extra effort from government institutions such as the State Department and the Senate to avoid inconsistencies[17]. If inconsistencies are present, there is a greater risk of undermining long-term U.S. security interests. If bilateral agreements are publicly available, Russia and China may attempt to exploit U.S. IRM inconsistencies to maintain strategic advantages over the U.S.. This would place U.S. security interests at greater risk than the present situation. If bilateral agreements are negotiated in tandem, the risk of inconsistency still remains present due to potential miscommunication between U.S. negotiators. The benefits of bilateral agreements are only present if both Russia and China are addressed. If one negotiation fails to end in an agreement with one state, then the other agreement would have essentially failed. This would place the U.S. in the same situation that it had tried to avoid by withdrawing from the INF treaty.
Policy Recommendation #3:
Recommendation:
Negotiate a multilateral IRM treaty
Pro:
A multilateral IRM treaty holds lucrative benefits if negotiated well. It would allow the U.S. to avoid the costs associated with an IRM arsenal and guarantee Chinese and Russian IRM disarmament. A multilateral IRM treaty would include strong disincentives for cheating, as it would focus on the threat of the defector. A multilateral deal could also allow for an expansionary framework, which the INF failed to include. Allowing other states to join the framework would disincentivize. a defection on the grounds of new threats and security contexts. This would incentivize operating within the treaty framework rather than withdrawing.
A multilateral IRM agreement would also entail comprehensive inspection and verification protocols for all signing parties. IAEA inspectors from each signatory state could be used to uphold stringent regulations. This would minimize threats of cheating and increase the agreement’s durability. Lastly, pursuing a multilateral IRM treaty would increase international stability. The recent rise in nationalism and isolationism has caused limited military and economic conflict between great powers such as the US and China but risks a classical Thucydides trap. Pursuing a multilateral IRM agreement would assuage the potential for greater conflict by both removing weapons and opening communication lines.
Con:
The most obvious significant drawback is the actual negotiation process. of such an agreement. The INF treaty was notorious for its difficulty and was the culmination of years of massive diplomatic efforts. on both sides. An agreement with 5+ members would be nearly impossible to legally ratify in each state, the CTBT is a prime example. Without ratification, the efficacy of the treaty would be limited. For example, The U.S. failed to ratify the JCPOA in Congress which allowed for the eventual Trump’s withdrawal [18]. This agreement would only be useful for the U.S. if both Russia and China supported it, but China has indicated that it would not [19]. Chinese IRMs have dual capabilities and can reach many regional neighbors [20]. A multilateral treaty would restrict its offensive capabilities in these conflicts, which is the basis of Chinese refusal [21]. China has also previously declined multilateral IRM negotiation in 2019 from Germany and Japan for this reason [22]. It also went as far as to vow to “never participate” in a three-party arms agreement [23].
The rigidity of such an agreement would also strongly punish U.S. defection. The U.S. may need to withdraw from the agreement for security purposes in the future. Withdrawal from a multilateral treaty may allow Russia and China to cooperate in punishing the U.S. Cooperative sanctions or IRM deployment between Russia and China would pose a massive threat to the U.S. economically and militarily.
Selected Policy Recommendation:
Negotiate a multilateral IRM treaty:
For the Biden administration, negotiation of a multilateral IRM treaty would be the most efficient policy. Although multilateral agreements are difficult to complete and more difficult to ratify domestically, they present the least risks. A successful negotiation would expand the previous INF treaty to include China and an expansionary framework. If the abolition of IRMs is not feasible, then gradual arms control would also be negotiable under this option. In comparison, the best-case scenario for nuclear proliferation would be a nuclear standoff. Bilateral agreements may allow for more preferable terms than a multilateral agreement, but lack in durability.
The risks of other options are significantly higher than in multilateral negotiations. The economic burden of proliferation and its risk of a nuclear arms race or conflict rule out the feasibility of mass U.S. proliferation. Attempting to negotiate independent bilateral agreements with Russia and China risks inconsistencies. This would risk receiving a bad deal on both sides and coming up short of U.S. security goals. However, a failed multilateral agreement would allow for these other policy options to be pursued as backup options. Although a failed multilateral approach may threaten the potential for bilateral negotiations, it is more likely than pursuing multilateral negotiations after failed bilateral negotiations. Overall, multilateral negotiations leverage the most benefits with the least risk.
Potential Unintended Consequences:
Any multilateral agreement could end like the INF treaty, which failed through its inability to include third parties. Although an expansionary framework is possible, it cannot force states to join. This may allow other states to follow China’s proliferation of tactics. This would prolong the IRM issue rather than solve it. If a multilateral treaty subsequently fails, this could hinder future security and diplomatic efforts. There is also the issue of cheating. Cheating could cause international instability and would risk conventional or nuclear conflict. China and Russia have been accused of cheating on numerous agreements. For example, Russia and China have been accused of cheating on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty[24]. Russian and Chinese cheating is possible and could pose a significant threat.
Pursuing a multilateral agreement with China could be taken harshly. The Chinese government has stated that it would not be open to such agreements. U.S. efforts to force an agreement may further increase tensions between them. This may exacerbate issues such as the South China Sea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the Uighur internment. China may also respond through increased proliferation. Chinese proliferation may subsequently lead to Russian proliferation. This would forfeit any potential gains of multilateral cooperation and increase security risks for the U.S.
Both a successful and failed multilateral agreement would impact negotiations of all means in the future. A successful multilateral IRM agreement would increase trust within the international system. An increase in the trust would increase the stability of the liberal international order. This may increase the likelihood of negotiations in the future being multilateral, whether economic, diplomatic, or militaristic. However, a failed multilateral agreement would have the opposite effect. Decreasing trust in other states would continue the current trend of realism, populism, and authoritarianism. This would affect the U.S. both domestically and internationally.
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