Introduction:
Ever since the CIA backed the coup against democratically chosen Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953, the United States has had to deal with a complicated relationship with Iran. From the hostage crisis to the “axis of evil” speech, the two states had never truly been on a path towards peace until the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed on 14 July 2015. Ironically, the Iranian attempt to secure the capability to make nuclear weapons presented the United States with the opportunity to confront Iran and peacefully lead it to the negotiation table, a miracle considering that the United States still does not have any official diplomatic ties with Iran and vice versa. Although the effectiveness and durability of the deal may be debated, this first step by the Obama administration was a positive one towards developing a healthier relationship with Iran and the Middle East as a whole.
However, the maximum pressure campaign of the Trump administration, which included withdrawal from the JCPOA agreement, military action taking out Quds Force head Qasem Soleimani, and an abundance of last-minute threats against the Islamic Republic, has left the upcoming Biden administration in a difficult position. The prominence of the issue will only increase if Iran implements a law mandating production of enriched Uranium to 20% in response to the Israeli/United States killing of Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh. The events that occurred between the United States and Iran in 2020 alone prove just how flammable and unstable the situation has become, both politically and militarily. Therefore, in terms of foreign policy, the JCPOA agreement will be the single most significant issue that the Biden administration will have to tackle, and thus, a deep dive into the recent events, actors involved, and the policies possible is necessary to understand the trajectory of the relationship and potential for conflict in the near future.
A Brief Overview of Nuclear Iran:
In order to adequately discuss the policy options available to the Biden administration, it is important to understand the nuclear goals of Iran and the context in which the past negotiations have existed. The Iranian nuclear program dates back to the 1950s, when the United States aided Iran in setting up a peaceful program through the Atoms for Peace initiative. However, this aid ended as the Iranian revolution took place in 1979. At this point in time, Iran was not seen as a threat to develop nuclear weapons, but this began to change during the 1990s when assumptions were made about Iran’s goals in the region. Some predicted that a nuclear arsenal would aid Iran in achieving its goal of regional security, independence from western powers, and being a significant player on the world stage; others felt that Iran would not take such a bold risk right after the end of the Cold War as it had no urgent existential security issues. However, the former prediction proved to be all too accurate, as by 2002 the National Council of Resistance of Iran, a militant opposition group, revealed that Iran had built nuclear facilities near Natanz and Arak without informing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in advance. By 2003, the IAEA called for Iran to suspend all enrichment until inspectors were allowed to conduct tests and discover the full extent of the program. The fear that Iran might obtain a nuclear weapon was then compounded by the failure of Iran to continue a temporary suspension of enrichment after a 2004 Paris agreement and a CIA assessment in 2007 that Iran had an organized weapons program up till 2003 and an unorganized program up until 2009.
However, it is also important to note that Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has repeatedly stated over the past decade that Iran will not be pursuing nuclear weapons as he has declared them as incompatible with Islam. However, it can be argued that Iran’s activities against its domestic dissidents and support of organizations such as Hezbollah indicate that religious or moral standards may not always be followed in practice. Lastly and likely most obviously, the majority of the risk of Iran developing nuclear weapons does not fall on the United States, but rather on U.S. allies in the region. Iran has not shied away from confrontation with Israel and Saudi Arabia, both of which are long-standing U.S. partners. The potential for Iranian nuclear weapons may potentially be an existential threat to Israel – even though Israel possesses an undeclared nuclear arsenal -- and would fundamentally change the security calculus in the region for all states, as well as harm all U.S. interests in the region.
This brief history is relevant as it allows for the discussion of U.S. policies early in Iran’s nuclear history. U.S. policies over this period of time have ranged from supporting Iranian nuclear technology to threatening all out military escalation. The most prominent and relevant U.S. approaches to Iranian nuclear weapons come in the form of containment, multilateral diplomacy, and maximum pressure. The policy of containment can be applied to the time period of 1990 - 2006, as the United States kept a close watch on Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities but allowed the IAEA and United Nations Security Council to take charge. From 2006 - 2016, the United States became the primary actor in regards to stopping Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, mainly due to influence from Israel. During this period, multilateral negotiations and sanctions were seen as the best combination of methods to get Iran to the negotiating table and stay there. There was also the first use of cyberwar by the US and Israel against Iran’s enrichment facility at Natanz and Israel is believed responsible for the assassination of a half dozen Iranian nuclear scientists. The extent of these sanctions and what pre-conditions were necessary to get the United States to the negotiating table were hotly debated, but this overall method was followed by both the Bush and Obama administrations. The defining moment of this era was of course the singing of the JCPOA alongside the other members of the P5 +1. From 2016 - the present, however, the Trump administration has opted for an all-out attack on Iran using a variety of methods. Warfare economically, diplomatically, and even physically have not been off limits over the past four years with the key achievements of prior eras being nearly erased from memory.
Biden’s Views During the Obama Administration:
An important insight into what the Biden administration may aim to accomplish in the next four years with Iran comes from looking at what he has supported in the past. During his tenure as both a chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and as Vice President, Joe Biden has been in influential foreign policy positions throughout Iran’s tenure as a nuclear weapons threat. In 2006, as the Senior Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Biden publicly announced support for the Bush administration’s talks with Iran alongside the states that eventually entered into the JCPOA. However, he also stated that the United States should aim to exhaust all diplomatic options and go to the negotiating table calling for “direct talks with Iran - anywhere, anytime, with everything on the table - not just the nuclear program”. He specifically mentioned that issues such as terrorism, Iraq, Afghanistan, Israeli-Palestinian peace, sanctions, and security, should be brought up with Iranian negotiators, but that the nuclear program should be at the forefront of negotiations. If Biden still believes that this is a viable approach – and it appears from his recent remarks that he does -- policy options would likely aim higher than simply getting back to the status quo under the Obama administration. Rather, it may indicate that the Biden administration may attempt to either re-enter into the agreement with certain preconditions for Iran to meet or re-enter and attempt to reshape a new agreement in the long run, rather than simply re-entering the old deal and allowing future administrations to deal with the other issues Iran presents.
One of the more pressing questions of today is whether the United States or Iran would back down first in order to create a path to the United States’ re-entry to the JCPOA. In this case, the Biden administration may look back to his previous comments on entering into talks with Iran when the JCPOA was being negotiated. As Vice President under the Obama administration, Biden consistently held that no one-on-one meetings would be held with Iran if they were not to enter them “in good faith”, which could be interpreted as proving that they are willing to commit to the deal. As Iran has significantly over enriched in the past year in retaliation to the heavy sanctions the U.S. has put into effect, Biden may be looking for a substantial drop in their enrichment before revoking U.S. sanctions and re-entering the JCPOA agreement. This approach would be supported by actions Biden took in 2013 alongside then Secretary of State John Kerry, as they both admitted that U.S. sanctions had helped bring Iran to the negotiating table. However, in this same hearing, both Biden and Kerry stated that harsher sanctions once Iran got to the negotiating table would have the opposite effect and drive Iran away from negotiation and further towards developing a nuclear weapon. Therefore, a Biden administration may consider repeating this strategy and continuing Trump era sanctions until Iran indicates they are ready to stick with the JCPOA.
The Lasting Impact of the Trump Administration on Iran:
Lastly, in order to predict the approach that the Biden administration will take in curbing Iran’s nuclear program it is important to understand where the United States has left off. The Trump administration has quite blatantly attempted to remove any legacy of the Obama administration both domestically and internationally, even going so far as including it in some of its campaign promises. The JCPOA can be considered the legacy achievement of the Obama administration’s foreign policy and thus the Trump administration has tried its best to decimate the agreement’s past and future. This of course starts with the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the agreement on 8 May 2018. Since then, the Trump administration has unilaterally attempted to isolate Iran from the global economy by imposing crippling sanctions that have shrunk Iran’s GDP 8% from March 2019 to March 2020 according to the IMF. These sanctions have brought Iran to the brink of economic collapse and have yet to deter the regime from retaliating. Rather than slow down enrichment, Iran has increased its enrichment process to levels roughly twelve times greater than allowed under the JCPOA, cutting the timeline for producing enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon from a year to six months. These sanctions have also caused Iran to take drastic measures such as mining oil tankers near the Strait of Hormuz. Beyond sanctions, the Trump administration assassinated Iran war hero and Quds Force leader Commander Qasem Soleimani in Iraq. Although Soleimani had been a U.S. target since 2008, the timing and completion of the operation was crucial for Trump’s maximum pressure campaign.
More recently, the Trump administration has attempted a last-minute sabotage of the future of the JCPOA by apparently supporting the assassination of a top Iranian nuclear scientist. The assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, who the United States and Israel believed led Iran’s past nuclear weapon’s program, has severely angered Iran. On top of this, reports have come out detailing Trump’s interest in taking military action against Iranian nuclear facilities. This has led to Iranian outrage, possibly making it much more difficult for the Biden administration to come back into the JCPOA. This has been supported by a statement from Iran’s deputy foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, who has indicated that officials in Iran are insistent on the United States entering into compliance with the agreement before Iran reduces its enriching processes, even going so far as to say that they would not even consider a temporary freeze until the United States comes into full compliance with the agreement. Overall, the Trump administration has made it as difficult as possible (barring a full-scale war with Iran) for the Biden administration to deal with Iran. Within four years, the Trump administration has flipped the narrative on which party is least trustworthy in staying in compliance. Thus, the Biden administration must reconsider its approach to re-entering the JCPOA, as the campaign plan of asking Iran to come into compliance with the agreement unconditionally before sanctions are lifted does not seem likely.
Policy Options and Goals for the Biden Administration:
Taking the history of Iran’s nuclear goals, Biden’s actions during the Obama administration, and the position that the Trump administration has left the Biden administration in, predictions can now be made about what goals the administration may have, who may be involved, and how these goals may be achieved. It is immediately clear that the Biden administration would like to return to the original JCPOA agreement, however, how this may occur is unclear. Biden campaigned in a context where Coronavirus was the most pressing issue, leaving issues of foreign policy on the periphery and giving little indication what channels he plans on using to communicate with Iran and reach an agreement. Biden has recently made clear that his optimal solution would include Iran returning to strict compliance with the nuclear deal, followed immediately by the lifting of sanctions and the United States re-entering the deal. However, he failed to mention any methods or channels that would allow for any communication between Iran and the United States. On the other hand, Iranian foreign minister Javad Zarif stated that he is confident that no communication between the two states would be necessary to get both parties in full compliance with the deal, saying that Biden would only need to sign “three executive orders”.
Nonetheless, even though the Biden administration’s options are limited, there are still a number of different approaches that could be taken to achieve a more stable relationship with Iran and bring the relationship back to where it was prior to the Trump administration. Firstly, there is the aforementioned Biden campaign plan. Secondly, the Biden administration may use European allies in the JCPOA as a negotiation channel with Iran. Thirdly, the Biden administration may take the onus of moving first and re-entering into the JCPOA without any preconditions. Lastly, there is the possibility of entering into the JCPOA without any preconditions and immediately entering into negotiations with all members of the JCPOA agreement to make a longer lasting agreement that would address additional problems regarding Iran and the Middle East.
The benefits of the original Biden campaign plan are immediately evident. The Biden administration would be able to appease Republican colleagues by preventing any further Iranian enrichment, as well as keep sanctions pressure on them to stop them from cheating. The probability of this occurring is low as mentioned prior, however, it is not impossible. If the Biden administration were to open an unconditional diplomatic channel directly between Iran and the United States, U.S. officials might be able to reinstate confidence in the Iranian regime that the United States will not renege on its commitments again. However, this would also require significant support from Iranian parliament. This was not an issue prior to the killing of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, as President Hassan Rouhani was optimistic about the likelihood of both parties returning to compliance within mere months of Biden’s term. Other incentives that the Biden administration may include outside of revoking sanctions would be to unfreeze the Iranian funds in Citibank accounts from 2008 and return them to Iran. Although only 23% of the $2 billion is still remaining, this move may incentivize Iran to at least temporarily freeze Uranium enrichment and get the Biden administration on the right track. The US could also stop blocking a $5 billion IMF loan to Iran for Covid relief and allow Iran access to millions of dollars in oil revenues frozen in other accounts abroad.
On the other hand, trying too hard to get the optimal solution may only hurt the prospects for a stable relationship in the long run. Pushing too hard for a deal with Iran right after a “maximum pressure” campaign nearly incited war between the two states would make it seem more of a timid continuation of the Trump administration than a genuine promotion of peace. Iran has been on the receiving end of most of the wrongdoing over the past four years and feels as if it deserves greater respect under the Biden administration. Risking such a deadlock would put the Biden administration’s goal of having Iran in full compliance with the agreement in the near future at risk, as there are roughly six months between Joe Biden’s first day in office and the Iranian presidential election, which is likely to be won by a representative of the right wing Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.
This leads to the second policy option, using European allies in the JCPOA as a negotiation channel with Iran. Compared to the turbulent relationship between the United States and Iran, European-Iranian relations could be considered quite stable. The three European partners in the JCPOA have direct diplomatic channels with Iran that the United States could use to negotiate a tit-for-tat re-entry into compliance for both parties. By reaching out to Iran through our European allies first, we may be able to convince Iran to take the first step of going back into compliance. This may be a temporary freeze of uranium production. However, it is more likely that the United States would have to make the first move due to the outrage of the Iranian government over the recent assassination and the fact that the US violated its commitments to the JCPOA first. A first move may be as simple as revoking the most recent Trump sanctions and keeping the unilateral sanctions applied for non-nuclear matters. Such a strategy would allow for each side to make its goals clear, which has been a chronic issue in the history of U.S.-Iran relations. A reciprocal strategy would also allow the United States and its European allies to bring up Iranian issues outside of the nuclear compliance issue, which Biden had aimed at during his tenure as a senator.
The downside of a strategy through European allies is that Iran’s presidential elections are set to take place in June 2021. If the process is too slow, then the United States and the rest of JCPOA partners risk having to deal with a more conservative Iranian president who would ask more of the United States than Hassan Rouhani. Overall, the speed of the negotiation would be determined by the slower actor. If either side is hell-bent on the other party deescalating first, then the prospect of any reciprocal strategy would fall through. Also, although Europe may be an efficient diplomatic middle man between Iran and the United States, it still acts as a middle man. This would mean that the Biden administration would have to give more significance to the goals of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, rather than solely focus on the desires of domestic influences. This would cause unnecessary friction domestically as the Biden administration’s main aim is to heal political division in the United States. If he were to give significant influence to European allies, who are typically further left-leaning, then Republican colleagues at home may feel slighted and overlooked, which would only increase political division.
The third potential policy would be the Biden administration moving first and entering into the JCPOA without any preconditions. This move is the preferred approach of Iran.
The benefit of such a move would be that, if successful, the Biden administration would be able to get Iran back in compliance with the JCPOA as fast as possible before the Iranian presidential election occurs, which a source close to Biden said is of great importance to him and his team. For the most part, this would satisfy all predicted goals of the Biden administration and in theory may only require a handful of executive orders and actions, such as simply recertifying the deal within the next 90-day cycle. Overall, this approach could bring the United States-Iran relationship back to its stable condition prior to withdrawal.
The plausibility of such an approach would depend on what the Biden administration believes will occur in the next Iranian presidential election. If reports of Iran leaning heavily toward a more conservative president are correct, then this may be the optimal option for the Biden administration, although it would rather Iran move first. Although economic leverage may be on the side of the United States, moral and diplomatic leverage leans heavily in favor of Iran. After four years of enduring a maximum pressure campaign that the Biden administration will most likely not replicate, Iran may feel that it deserves greater respect from the United States. After complying with the agreement for the two years that the United States was included in the deal, Iran has proven its commitment to the deal. Not only would such a move be supported by Iran, but also by U.S. allies and other members of the JCPOA such as China and Russia. Not only would this increase Iran’s faith in U.S. commitments, but it would help the United States recover its name on the international stage. Such an approach would be welcomed by Iran as foreign minister Javad Zarif has stated that simply lifting all sanctions and guaranteeing re-entry to the JCPOA through some means would be enough to get Iran back to full compliance. This would also give the Biden administration the most leeway in potentially addressing other U.S.-Iran issues alongside the nuclear problem, as it could use its immediate unconditional re-entry into the JCPOA agreement as a sort of diplomatic leverage.
The most prominent issue with this policy is that there is no guarantee that Iran returns to compliance with the JCPOA. Unless the Biden administration makes the monumental step of opening direct diplomatic relations with Iran, there is no way for the United States to guarantee that it's lifting of sanctions and re-entry into the JCPOA agreement is of any use. The only other way to achieve a guarantee of compliance by Iran would be to communicate with Iran through European allies. If they do not comply, then the Biden administration would have found itself with nowhere to go other than attempting a rework of Trump’s maximum pressure campaign.
Lastly, there is the possibility of entering into the JCPOA without any preconditions and immediately entering into negotiation talks with all members of the JCPOA agreement to make a longer-lasting agreement that would severely punish any unilateral moves for any party. This appears to be the preferred strategy of newly appointed Secretary of State Antony Blinken. As a key negotiator of the deal in the Obama administration, Antony Blinken will likely attempt to convince President-elect Biden that all efforts must be made to re-enter the JCPOA in order to set up a better deal in the long run. This point of view is likely to be supported by John Kerry, who is slated to be Biden’s climate envoy and by Jake Sullivan, the incoming national security advisor, who took part in backchannel talks with Iran in 2012 and 2013. As Secretary of State during the negotiation of the JCPOA, it is clear that Kerry will support any approach that gets the United States back into the agreement.
It is also no secret that one of the most criticized aspects of the JCPOA has been its sunset clauses. Republicans railed against what they saw as a short-term delay of Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions and preferred a definite guarantee that Iran would never pursue nuclear weapons and further provisions calling for an end to Iranian support of proxies and potentially even ballistic missiles advancement. If performed successfully, it would not only fulfill Biden’s foreign policy goals, it may also aid in his campaign for domestic political unity, if the aforementioned issues are brought to the negotiation table and are resolved. This would likely be the best of both worlds for regional allies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia as well. Although re-entering into the agreement is not a tactic either state supports, re-entering with plans of negotiating a stricter deal that includes provisions on the aforementioned issues alongside the nuclear weapons issue would satisfy their security issues.
Of course, this policy is far from perfect and its plausibility is questionable. Although Iran would welcome an unqualified U.S. re-entry to the JCPOA agreement, it has repeatedly stated that any renegotiations are currently off the table. The Iranian government has consistently held that the current JCPOA agreement is a closed deal and any renegotiation would be a sign of weakness on its behalf. Thus, this policy would only be possible if renegotiation is only framed as an extension of the deal, rather than any significant change to the current framework. Although Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Republicans may view this as insufficient to resolve the security issues of today, there is no reality in which Iran accepts a major renegotiation of the treaty while complying with the current JCPOA agreement. For this to occur, either the Biden administration would have to throw away its goals and go against its foreign policy ideology and personnel in order to take the Trump administration's maximum pressure strategy to new heights, or Iran would have to give up any semblance of security or influence in the region, neither of which would occur without significant military conflict following suit.
Conclusion:
Overall, the relationship between the United States and Iran will remain complex for the foreseeable future. However, the Biden administration has the unique opportunity to significantly improve the relationship at one of its most unstable points. Nonetheless, such an achievement is far from complete and far from simple. Although the Obama administration was able to strike a historic deal, many actors domestically and internationally were left wondering whether more could be done. The subsequent Trump administration attempted to appease those who saw the deal as a failure and left the future Biden administration with a relationship with Iran and the international community in tatters. Although limited by the last-minute actions of the Trump administration, there are policy options that allow the United States, its allies, and Iran to stabilize the dire situation.
Going off Biden’s track record as a Senator and Vice President, it is likely that President-elect Biden will stick to the promises he has made over his career and over his campaign and attempt to incentivize Iran to re-enter full JCPOA compliance in return for lifting sanctions and recertifying the JCPOA agreement. However, recent remarks from Hassan Rouhani and Javad Zarif detailing Iran’s willingness to fully comply with the JCPOA once economic sanctions are lifted and a guarantee of re-entry is made by the United States, may be too good to pass up. These remarks, as well as the influence of Antony Blinken, Jake Sullivan and John Kerry make this look like the most likely approach.
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