I'd like to preface this article with the fact that the article does not articulate my personal views on faith and religions, but rather an introduction to philosophy's view on evil. The debate on evil is still one of the most controversial topics in philosophy, but nonetheless is a defining measure of the course of philosophy over time. It is for this reason that I feel it is necessary to discuss this topic on my personal blog, although I may not agree with any particular perspective discussed.
Introduction:
One of the most lasting and influential debates in philosophy is that of the existence of God. This debate has taken many forms, such as whether or not believing in God is a good risk to take, as shown by Pascal’s wager, or whether or not testimonies indicating miracles supported by God should be believed, as shown by Hume’s empiricism. However, one of the most significant discussions on the existence of God is that of the Problem of Evil. For centuries, philosophers have debated whether or not the existence of evil in the world is logically contradictory, or even good evidence that God does not exist. In this paper, I aim to identify a crucial issue regarding the existence of God in regards to evil: religious warfare. Within this argument, I will be referencing the ideas of philosophers such as Johnson and Hick in order to analyze the Problem of Evil in regards to specific examples of religious war and evil in the name of faith, such as the Judeo-Roman wars, the Crusades, and terrorism incited by groups such as ISIS. Lastly, I will both identify and respond to potential critiques that could be made by both modern and classical theist viewpoints of the Problem of Evil, specifically citing the Irenaean and Augustinian theodicies, as well as the modern philosopher Gellmann. The overarching goal of this argument is to indicate that the existence of religious wars is logically incompatible with the existence of God, as God’s omnipotence and omnibenevolence should be utilized in cases where faith is being used to justify evil, even if free will is a necessary factor to achieve God’s purpose, and even if logically compatible, the plausibility of the existence of God is unlikely due to these cases.
Background of Philosophical Concepts:
In order to properly analyze the Problem of Evil in regards to religious warfare, it is important to identify and understand existing literature. The Problem of Evil can refer to two separate arguments on the existence of God, the logical problem and the evidentiary problem. The logical problem states that Evil and the existence of God are logically contradictory, whereas the evidentiary problem states that evil is enough evidence to indicate that God does not exist. The logical problem can be summarized in the form of three premises and a conclusion ("Logical Problem Of Evil | Internet Encyclopedia Of Philosophy", 2020):
(1). if an omnibenevolent God were to exist, they would not want any evil to happen
(2). If an omnipotent God were to exist, they would be able to stop all evil from occurring
(3). There is evil in the world
(C). Therefore, an omnibenevolent and omnipotent God does not exist
The evidentiary argument follows the same form of argument; however, its aim is not to logically conclude that God does not exist through the validity of its argument or the truth of its premises, but rather, the notion that not everything logically possible is likely (Rachels & Rachels, 2012). The evidentiary argument is meant to respond to theists that make cases which logically allow for the existence of both God and evil, by indicating that a logically plausible outcome is not necessarily a likely outcome, and thus evil is good evidence that God does not exist.
The problem of Evil also makes the distinction between two types of evil: moral and natural (Rachels & Rachels, 2012). Moral evil refers to evil that is the consequence of humanity’s actions, whereas natural evil is a result of natural disasters such as hurricanes, tornados, tsunamis, etc. The issue of religious warfare would typically be classified as a moral evil, as warfare and its associated evils are the product of human actions. However, there may be an argument that religious warfare could be a natural evil as some trace its origins to Abrahamic scriptures.
In reference to both versions of the Problem of Evil, there are typically two categories of responses: theodicies and defenses (Tooley, 2019). Theodicies aim to explain the reasons why God permits evil, whereas defenses simply aim to defend the possibility that the existence of God and evil at the same time is logically possible (Tooley, 2019). Theodicies are typically preferred as defenses only respond to the logical version of the problem, and disregard the evidentiary problem. Some important theodicies that must be considered in regards to religious warfare, are those of Saint Augustine and Saint Irenaeus. The Augustinian theodicy indicates that evil is a lack of goodness on behalf of humanity and that free will is necessary as a world with human free will is better than that of a world without human free will (Tooley, 2019). It also goes on to say that natural evil is a punishment against humanity for the moral evils it commits (Tooley, 2019). On the other hand, the Irenaean theodicy states that evil is necessary to help transform humanity into perfect followers of God, as we must learn to become good, not simply be born good. It argues that a world with no evil would not allow humans with free will to develop morally, and thus God’s purpose in creating humanity itself would not be served, therefore both moral evil and natural evil must exist (Tooley, 2019).
Form of Argument:
In order to show how the existence of God is logically incompatible with the existence of evil, the case of warfare in the name of faith may be used. The argument I aim to make follows the form of three premises and a conclusion:
(1). If God is all good, then he shouldn’t want any evil to happen in the name of faith
(2). If God is all powerful, then he should be able to stop any evil from occurring in the name of faith
(3). However, evil still occurs in the name of faith through religious warfare
(C). Therefore, God in the Abrahamic characterization does not exist
This argument stems from the numerous examples of religious warfare in history and in scripture. Stemming from the most recent example, terrorist groups such as ISIS have used faith and scripture in order to commit innumerable acts of evil such as stonings, beheadings, murder of children, burning people to death, as well as many other gruesome evils upon innocent people. Many ISIS fighters cite Quranic quotes such as, “But when the forbidden months are past, then fight and slay the Pagans wherever ye find them, and seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war)” (Surah At-Tawbah, verse 5), as commandments from God to commit their acts of evil. This same strategy was employed during the Crusades by both the Muslim and Christian fighters as they went to war with one another. Crusaders often cited the following passage from the Bible as a means of rationalizing their acts of gratuitous evil: “I will make of you a great nation, and I will bless you, and make your name great, so that you will be a blessing. I will bless those who bless you, and the one who curses you I will curse” (Genesis 12:2). Lastly, during the Judeo-Roman wars and the invasion of the Canaanites, the Jewish people went to war with the belief that God commanded them to do so and expected holy intervention in their campaigns. In the latter, they cited the following passage from the Torah: “I will destroy all the people whom you encounter; I will make all your enemies turn their backs to you. I will send hornets before you that will drive out the Hivite, the Canaanite, and the Hittite before you. (Book of Exodus 23:27)”.
These passages are not brought up to slander these religions as violent faiths, but rather to show the contradiction between evil and the existence of God through scripture and subsequent violence and evil. The evidence of such scripture, as well as historical accounts of the violence within these religious wars, add an extra layer to the Problem of Evil that was not previously discussed. Not only does God allow for gratuitous evil, but God may play a part in the moral evil at hand in the first place. This directly contrasts from the Abrahamic characterization of God, which indicates that he is omnibenevolent. How could a God that plays a hand in the barbaric evils of religious warfare be omnibenevolent? To further analyze this, the ideas of philosophers such as Johnson and Hick may be useful.
Applying Johnson and Hick:
The philosopher John Hick is typically characterized as a staunch proponent of the soul making theodicy which is his derivation of the Irenaean theodicy (Tooley, 2019). It states that God created the world in such a way that humans would be able to grow through their decision-making powers of free will and that this world is not meant to be perfect in the first place, as proponents of the non-existence of God seem to indicate (Rachels & Rachels, 2012). This theodicy places a great emphasis on the free will defense as a means of rationalizing the existence of evil, as a world without free will would be worse than that of a world with free will like our world. However, in his writings, he defines free will through the quote: “...by free actions we mean actions that are not externally compelled, but flow from the nature of agents as they react to the circumstances in which they find themselves…” (Hick, 1963) This would indicate that the free will defense only works when evil acts come from human decision making, however, this may not be the case in religious warfare. This can be shown by the appeals to scripture previously mentioned. Could direct commandments by God through scripture to wage war be classified as human free will in the first place? Religious warfare is not a natural evil in the same sense that natural disasters are, however, it may be one when examining it through the definition of a natural evil. A natural evil can be defined as “bad states of affairs which do not result from the intentions or negligence of moral agents” (Tooley, 2019).. Taking this definition into consideration, if God were to command man to go to war, then would it really be a moral evil in the sense that there is free will involved? It is not out of the scope of God to do so as he is omnipotent according to Abrahamic religions, but this would once again go directly against the characterization of an omnibenevolent God. Thus, it could be determined that religious warfare is a direct act of evil by God himself and that humans that commit acts of evil in the name of scripture are simply the vessel through which he acts, as they have no other choice but to respect the command of God, even if it may be inherently evil. This would logically result in the non-existence of a God in the Abrahamic characterization of an omnibenevolent God.
There is also the philosopher B.C. Johnson, who makes the point that if God were held to the same standard as humans, we would find that God is not omnibenevolent, but possibly even evil (Tooley, 2019).. If a human were to justify horrible acts of war and violence in the name of faith, or even in any capacity, we would label them as evil. This is the exact case of Osama Bin Laden, who cited scripture and God’s commandments in order to rationalize his violence. However, there are two ways of thinking about this issue: God’s evil originates in his commandment of evil in the name of faith or God’s evil originates through his lack of action to stop such evil in the name of faith. Had God commanded terrorists such as Bin Laden to commit their horrific acts of evil in the same way that Bin Laden commanded his Al-Qaeda members to hijack planes on 9/11, God would clearly be evil. On the other hand, if God were truly omnipotent and omnibenevolent, he would not have allowed for the horrifying events of 9/11 to occur in the name of his faith. This does not only go for Islam, but for all Abrahamic religions, as there are countless examples of religious warfare in each. If he allowed such acts to occur in his faith then he is just as guilty as the person who committed the crime as Johnson reasoned. It would then logically follow that God in the Abrahamic characterization does not exist, as through either view God could be characterized as evil.
Gellmann Potential Critique and Response:
Although there may be significant evidence that religious warfare may logically contradict the existence of God, there are surely numerous critiques that could be made upon this argument. One critique could be that of Gellmann, a modern philosopher that believes that “the pre-philosophical relevance of evil to belief in God is in an experience of God's non-existence” and that “There is a type of experience in which a person experiences evil and right there in the evil perceives that God does not exist” (Gellmann, 1992). Gellmann then further elaborates on his position by using the Holocaust as an example: “it is implausible in the extreme to suppose that someone who endured the horrors of the Nazi Holocaust in the extermination camps of World War II, is arguing, either inductively or deductively, from the fact of those evils to the non-existence of God. Rather, what seems highly more plausible to say is that such a person has lost his or her faith because in experiencing those evils he or she has had an experience of God's non-existence” (Gellmann, 1992). To summarize, Gellmann states that examples of evil do not necessarily act as factual evidence that God does not exist, but rather, in the face of evil, people experience a point in which they believe that God does not exist. This belief could be extended towards religious warfare in the sense that the gratuitous evils of warfare may simply be an experience of God’s nonexistence in the extreme and that this would not actually be evidence of the nonexistence of God in the grand scale.
In response to this potential critique, it is important to understand what form Gellmann’s argument takes. It is best described as a defense, rather than a theodicy, as it maintains that the existence of God and evil are not logically contradictory. However, this defense may not be applicable in respect to religious warfare, as religious warfare is inextricably linked to faith in the time of evil. Gellmann’s argument states that evils are simply moments where people feel as if they have experienced the non-existence of God, but this leaves out religious warfare as during these evils, all those committing acts of evil do so in the name of God. The fighters of the crusades and the Jewish fighters against the Canaanites and/or Romans all committed evil, heinous acts against other humans, and yet saw these as signs that God did exist. This would indicate that God may exist, but not in the Abrahamic characterization of an omnipotent and omnibenevolent being, as God being proven through acts of evil would logically concede that God is not omnibenevolent.
Classical Critiques and Responses:
Lastly, there are critiques that can be traced back to some of the most significant pieces in the literature surrounding the Problem of Evil: the Augustinian and Irenaean theodicies. The Augustinian theodicy would argue against the example of religious warfare as an argument against the existence of evil as a flaw of moral evil, as human free will caused the fall from grace that is exhibited by religious warfare. However, as I brought up the free will defense’s weaknesses in this case earlier, proponents of the Augustinian theodicy may argue that it is a natural evil from God in order to punish sinners through his followers. The Irenaean theodicy would go along the same lines and state that God commanded that such evil occur, as it is in God’s purpose to allow for religious warfare to occur, in order to teach humanity how to become better morally. This could be exemplified through humanity’s moral progression through history, as after genocides and religious warfare, progress can be seen in the form of governments that provide tolerance and equality for all people.
In response to the potential Augustinian critique, it would once again hold that God’s use of evil as punishment against sinners would be an example of his lack of omnibenevolence. It cannot be logically consistent for an omnibenevolent being to engage in acts in evil in order to punish those who do not have faith in such a creator. This would also bring up the relevance of hell and eternal damnation. What is the purpose of eternal torment in hell for sinners, if they are to be punished in this life anyways? This could be described as an example of gratuitous evil on God’s part, which is evidently an issue for the existence of an omnibenevolent God. This could also be held true in regards to the Irenaean theodicy. I find it hard to believe that an omnipotent God would find it necessary to inflict pain through religious warfare and evil just to teach moral lessons to his creations. Why would it not be possible to teach humanity how to be morally good by using tactics that do not include evil? If this is out of God’s power, then God is not omnipotent and does not exist in the Abrahamic characterization. If the critique states that evil must occur as this is the only way to serve God’s purpose, then would it not be held true that God’s purposes are inherently evil? If evil is necessary to serve a purpose, then how would it logically follow that the purpose is good? This would mean that the Abrahamic characterization of God would not exist in the sense that God would not be omnibenevolent.
Conclusion:
It can thus be seen that the issue of the Problem of Evil in regards to religious warfare and religious evils is a tough question in regards to the existence of an Abrahamic God. Although this paper includes some responses to a few of the criticisms that are to be expected, such as Gellmann’s critique and classical critiques, there are certainly many more that cannot be immediately predicted. There also are many more defenses of this article, spanning well beyond Hick’s definition of free will and Johnson’s measure of God’s character, and thus this issue of religious warfare is far from resolved. The question of the existence of God in philosophy will most definitely still rage on for decades, if not centuries, and there is much that can be learned about humanity in the process.
References
Gellmann, Jerome I. "A New Look At The Problem Of Evil". Faith And Philosophy, vol 9, no. 2, 1992, pp. 210-216. Philosophy Documentation Center, doi:10.5840/faithphil19929219.
Hick, John. "The Problem Of Evil". Philosophy Of Religion, Prentice-Hall, 1963.
"Logical Problem Of Evil | Internet Encyclopedia Of Philosophy". Iep.Utm.Edu, 2020, https://www.iep.utm.edu/evil-log/.
Rachels, James, and Stuart Rachels. Problems From Philosophy. 3rd ed., Mcgraw-Hill, 2012, pp. 27-37.
Rachels, James, and Stuart Rachels. The Truth About The World. Mcgraw-Hill, 2012, pp. 90-105.
Tooley, Michael, "The Problem of Evil", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/evil/>.
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