Introduction:
The great challenge of advancing the nuclear disarmament agenda has been relevant since the United States utilized the first atomic bombs in Japan. Next to climate change, the potential of thermonuclear warfare is the greatest threat to humanity, however, it is a much quicker process as it needs only a single mistake to put humanity at the brink of existence. Such risk was evident during the Cuban missile crisis, where the United States and the Soviet Union were possibly minutes away from thermonuclear warfare. However, since the Cold War, significant progress has been made in reducing the amount of nuclear armaments. Although, such progress seems to be gradually reversing the trend with a growing pressure for states to develop nuclear programs. This regression lends legitimacy to the discussion of the obstacles of disarmament and the future of nuclear armaments in regards to international security. It can be justified that nuclear disarmament, rather than reliance upon nuclear deterrence, is the appropriate measure towards world peace due to the reliability of nuclear deterrence upon a threat of destroying humanity, a threat that could very well be turned into action if the status quo is held and more unreliable states develop nuclear programs.
The Importance and Dimensions of the Problem:
Nuclear weapons since their creation have proven to be the most destructive weapons in human history, thus a nuclear ban treaty would be a rational agenda. Scott Sagan in “Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear Disarmament” summarizes the stance of disarmament by arguing that either the world’s current nuclear states must disarm or states will seek to develop nuclear armaments (1). An option to retain the status quo would not be possible as states such as India, North Korea, Pakistan, and Iran have shown us that states are willing and able to develop nuclear armaments under the status quo. Therefore, the international community is left with two long term options: either a nuclear disarmament treaty is universally accepted or universal development of nuclear armaments. The dangers of a fully nuclear armed international community would be an increase in the probability of nuclear warfare between states, of terrorist organizations taking hold of arms, and of misidentifications and misfires. Therefore, rather than taking the risk of having to diffuse each individual conflict in the future to prevent nuclear warfare, it would be in humanity’s best interest to ratify the NPT and identify the future steps of universal perpetual disarmament (2).
Those that disagree with a nuclear ban treaty cite a common thread of rationale. The case is best made by Glaser in “The Flawed Case for Nuclear Disarmament”, in which nuclear disarmament is portrayed as an inefficient solution to reduce the probability of nuclear weapons usage and would subsequently increase the probability of conventional warfare (3). Glaser indicates that support for nuclear disarmament conflates political problems with military problems. The counterfactual that nuclear armed countries with “good relations” are just as unlikely to engage in nuclear warfare as non-nuclear armed countries with “good relations” are to engage in nuclear rearmament and warfare is made in order to counter the nuclear disarmament (4). Glaser also argues that if nuclear disarmament were to occur, threats of other states developing nuclear weapons would increase the likelihood of states engaging in mass scale conventional warfare in order to avoid nuclear development by potentially malicious states (5). This would indicate that nuclear disarmament could lead to regression of world peace into mass violence as seen in the 20th century, rather than lead to progress that proponents of nuclear disarmament aim to achieve with nuclear ban policy.
Progress Since the End of the Cold War:
Progress in terms of the nuclear disarmament movement since the Cold War has been inspiring. The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons treaty signed in 1968 was a step in the right direction, however progress since has been stalling as there is an increasing amount of pressure for states to rearm in the current international climate. The perspective of the international community can be seen by the amount of states that have ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: 33 out of the 193 states in the United Nations (6). This is mainly due to a shift in the perception of disarmament as entry costs of nuclear development are much lower than that of the Cold War era.
Bret Stephens in a New York Times Op-Ed states that disarmament was successful only in disarming those who truly believe in disarmament, allowing their enemies and rivals to build up nuclear capabilities and ambitions (7). This can be shown through the number of states that have since joined the nuclear development community. Iran, Israel, Pakistan, India, and North Korea all either have established nuclear development programs or are in the process of developing such programs. Each of these states have been involved in a number of wars and conflicts, both with each other and other states. States such as Japan, Egypt, Bangladesh, and Saudi Arabia, all of which find enemies and allies with nuclear armaments are left vulnerable as they have opted for progress in nuclear disarmament, a risk that may not pay off in the future.
However, U.S. and USSR stockpiles have come down to approximately 6,000 each from peaks of roughly 30,000 and 40,000 warheads respectively; in terms of the world stockpile, there are approximately 14,000 nuclear warheads today, down from a peak of roughly 70,000 (8). These figures may seem to be progress in terms of disarmament, however, such disarmament also lowers the entry cost of nuclear development. A state presently only needs to develop a few hundred nuclear warheads to be on par with major powers such as France, the United Kingdom, and China, rather than having to produce in the thousands or tens of thousands. Such progress of disarmament thus seems to be correlated with states joining in nuclear development programs, a seemingly regressive concept in terms of global peace. If this trend continues, states may find their enemies and their allies joining the nuclear development community, opening up domestic ideas of a state nuclear development program for themselves as well.
The Main Obstacles to Progress:
Nuclear Energy vs. Nuclear Weaponry
One of the main challenges facing nuclear disarmament is how it would take place. Those that oppose disarmament find that it would be difficult to ascertain whether or not states are utilizing their capabilities for peaceful nuclear energy. Such use would align with the United Nations SDGs in reference to climate change, while potentially acting as a veil to more malicious activities. In order for the international community to ensure that nuclear capabilities are solely being utilized for peaceful purposes would require cooperation by all states and the commission of numerous watchdog groups alongside the International Atomic Energy Agency as described by the “Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons” within all nuclear facilities (9). This would be a daunting task as such provisions assume reliability of all nations and groups involved within the agreement, however unreliability is almost expected, as exemplified by Iran’s nuclear program. This would add to the anti-disarmament effort as successful cooperation on such a large-scale effort would be comparable to Glaser’s counterfactual; nations capable of such cooperation would be in no position to risk nuclear warfare in the first place. However, if resources are allocated efficiently and the ramifications of breaking the treatment are upheld strictly, then this would create an international space that is free of the risk of history’s most destructive weapons, while being able to access alternative sources of energy.
Nuclear Armaments as a Source of Legitimacy
One of the main concerns in the foreseeable future is the rise in the legitimacy of nuclear weapons development as a method of propelling a state to the world stage. Recent times have shown us that the major players in international affairs are either the economic leaders of the time, states with an abundance of natural resources pertinent to the era (in today's world: oil and lithium, while in the past: cotton and rubber), and/or states with nuclear arms. Of these three options, a developing state can make its quickest mark on the world stage through the development of nuclear arms. This can be seen with Iran and North Korea, as both states are now able to have more pull on the international stage due to the risk of their nuclear capabilities and willingness. If this trend continues, more states might attempt to build up nuclear armaments to receive foreign aid and loans to boost regime security and spur economic growth (10). This would lead to a much larger pool of states with nuclear armaments, and a higher risk of nuclear warfare, which is undoubtedly a situation that the international system should avoid at all costs. However, nuclear development is no simple task either. In conjunction with economic growth, nuclear development requires time and expertise, as well as many economic and natural resources, making the development of nuclear weaponry quite difficult for most states. However, the rapid advancement of technology and possibilities in technological breakthroughs could make nuclear development rapid and less expensive than in the past, increasing the risk of nuclear proliferation.
Nuclear Deterrence
Nuclear deterrence can be understood in two perspectives: the first is to deter states of the catastrophe of thermonuclear warfare through a limited nuclear attack, while the second is the deterrence of nuclear weapons usage through the risk of retaliation. Both of which can aid or reject the argument to retain nuclear weapons (11).
John Foster Dulles makes the argument for nuclear weapons through the logic of nuclear deterrence. Dulles stated that the threat of nuclear warfare works best against major aggressors at the center of international politics, rather than to threaten minor aggressions by periphery states (12). This qualification is significant as it explicitly defines the benefit of states keeping nuclear armaments by effectively creating a ceiling upon major aggressions by world powers. This is exemplified by Kenneth N. Waltz who gave the example of Russia attempting to enter NATO protected countries during the Cold War. They were unwilling to do so as the United States presented the risk of following up the aggression with either a nuclear barrage or a relatively small nuclear blast in an area near or within Russia as a reminder that thermonuclear warfare is possible and will be pursued if encroachment upon NATO states continued. This therefore decreases the height of confrontation that nuclear armed states have, as both are aware that a miscalculation that results in too aggressive an action, will lead to nuclear warfare (13).
The second perspective of nuclear deterrence can be understood by the same example. The United States would be disincentivized to detonate nuclear weapons in Russia as retaliation for NATO encroachment, due to the threat of a Russian nuclear response. If even one nuclear weapon were to survive, then the United States would be deterred by the catastrophic repercussions of a well-placed strike. Historically, nuclear deterrence has been a simple yet successful strategy as the ramifications of its failure are a crisis for humanity. However, this does not mean it is infallible, as it carries the logic that all states wish to avoid crisis, however this is not always the case for all regimes. This would also not account for nuclear proliferation to terrorist organizations, whose purpose is to incite fear and cause damage at all costs.
Justification of Nuclear Disarmament and Main Concerns for the Future:
Justification Through International Relationships
The post-World War II era has been that of the liberal world order, where many regional and international organizations have been created in order to progress towards peace. Since World War II, NATO has been one of the most influential of these organizations, however, nuclear disarmament is a challenge that it must tackle in order to remain stable in the future. Through the relationship between NATO, the United States, and other great powers, nuclear disarmament is a justifiable step towards world peace, rather than away from peace (14).
One of the main arguments that the United States has made to its non-nuclear NATO allies, who typically are pro-disarmament, in support of its nuclear capabilities is that it has provided a nuclear umbrella for NATO (15). The United States has firmly stated in a letter to its NATO allies that a nuclear weapons ban would limit its ability to utilize nuclear arms to defend NATO states should they ever be necessary (16). However, The Trump administration's stance on NATO being too dependent on the United States military for collective security comes in direct conflict with the United States letter to its NATO allies. A nuclear ban treaty would decrease NATO’s dependency on the United States as it relies upon the nuclear umbrella that the United States has set up (17). This would incentivize NATO members to spend a higher percentage of their GDP on military capabilities and alleviate some of the financial and military burden from the United States. Therefore, it is in the United States best interest to lead the disarmament movement. A U.S. led disarmament effort would be progress for the world effort and as the United States is the leader of the liberal world order, the leading world economy, and has the leading world military, it has the ability to establish it.
Russia and China would both appreciate a lowered tension with the United States. Russia more so than China would feel less vulnerable, as the threat of a nuclear armed United States upon its borders through NATO has been a significant factor in the tensions both during and after the Cold War era (18). However, China would also reap benefits in terms of security as it attempts to avoid a great power conflict with the United States. As great power conflicts have resulted in war 12 out of the last 16 times in the past 500 years, this would decrease the chance of thermonuclear warfare between the two, as well as diminish risks of conventional warfare (19). This would provide incentive for both Russia and China to follow suit. If all three of the world’s greatest military powers were to support nuclear deterrence, there would be very little incentive for any other state to develop nuclear armaments. Thus, the potential for an international system in which nuclear armaments and nuclear deterrence have no role, is possible and would be in the interest of all the great powers (20).
Although nuclear deterrence has been successful in preventing the Cold War from becoming a military conflict, it did so in an unsustainable manner. Nuclear deterrence is a strategy based on the threat of the end of humanity, such risks cannot be bargained in the long run as there is no guarantee that a nuclear option may not be the best option for a state on the brink of collapse (21). Therefore, not only is nuclear disarmament justified, it is the only strategy that ensures the safety of humanity in the long term.
The Possibility of Re-Entry
In addition to the agreement to ban nuclear weaponry, is the ability of such a treaty to last. Denuclearization in itself is a monumental task, however, there must be strict and immediate repercussions for any state that attempts or threatens to re-nuclearize. The ability to nuclearize and have a nuclear monopoly gives states incentive to cheat the agreement. If states in the area retain knowledge of nuclear weaponry in the form of personnel or documents, there is a potential risk of states hiding nuclear weapons programs in order to hold a military advantage. Provisions should thus include a destruction of any physical or digital schematics or blueprints of nuclear weaponry, statements on the response towards a state denuclearizing, and a discussion on how nuclear weaponry experts should be handled must be had in order to avoid concealed nuclear developments. This would also help avoid accidental nuclear proliferation to international terrorist organizations, further aiding international security.
An Attachment to Nuclear Deterrence
The main challenge of universal nuclear disarmament in the future is the historical success of nuclear deterrence. If nuclear deterrence continues to succeed in deterring major aggression then states may find it in their best interest to develop nuclear weapons or proliferate nuclear weapons. However, international terror organizations may be able to take advantage of the insecurities of failing states with youthful nuclear development programs and launch nuclear terror campaigns, a risk that must not be taken, especially due to the success of terror campaigns in the 21st century. Also, the logic of nuclear deterrence states that nuclear armed nations will not risk conflict with each other as the potential costs are catastrophic, however, with the rise in proxy wars around the world, the victims of a thermonuclear war may not be the citizens of the powers in conflict, but rather the people in the state where the proxy conflict takes place. This would reduce costs for both nuclear parties, whereas the battleground state would take all losses.
Great Power Conflicts Without Nuclear Deterrence
Lastly, a concern for the future would be the potential for a rise in great power conflicts using conventional warfare. One of the only benefits of nuclear weaponry was the incentive against direct major power conflict (22). The proxy wars of the Cold War were harmful, however thermonuclear warfare did not occur and that in itself was an accomplishment. A lack of nuclear deterrence may encourage powers such as Russia and China to attempt and test the United State military capacity in order to create their own unipolar moment, as the threat of thermonuclear warfare is removed, lowering the cost of conflict. This would allow Russia to return to its glory days of the Soviet Union and avenge China of their “century of humiliation”. This would also cement authoritarianism as the dominant world order, replacing liberalism and inhibiting democracy, a possibility that both Chinese and Russian leaders would find appealing if costs were low enough.
Conclusion:
In order to achieve a nuclear weapon free international system, cooperation by all states is necessary in rejecting the norm that nuclear deterrence is able to keep conflict at bay indefinitely. Nuclear deterrence may have been successful in the past, but an increasing amount of states with unstable regimes and youthful nuclear programs puts humanity in questionable hands, justifying the disarmament movement. However, the post-nuclear weapon international community, if it were to be achieved, must not abandon its pursuit of world peace as nuclear disarmament is only the first step in a long process towards global peace.
References:
1. Sagan, Scott D. 2009. "Shared Responsibilities For Nuclear Disarmament". Daedalus 138 (4): 157-168. doi:10.1162/daed.2009.138.4.157.
2. Blechman, Barry M., and Cathleen S. Fisher. 1994. "Phase Out The Bomb". Foreign Policy, no. 97: 79. doi:10.2307/1149441.
3. Glaser, Charles. 1998. "The Flawed Case For Nuclear Disarmament". Survival 40 (1): 112-128. doi:10.1093/survival/40.1.112.
4. Ibid., p.112-128
5. Ibid., p.112-128
6. "Signature/Ratification Status Of The Treaty On The Prohibition Of Nuclear Weapons | ICAN". 2019. Icanw.Org. https://www.icanw.org/status-of-the-treaty-on-the-prohibition-of-nuclear-weapons/.
7. Stephens, Bret. 2017. "Don't Ban the Bomb". The New York Times, 2017.
8. "Status of World Nuclear Forces". 2019. Federation Of American Scientists. https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/.
9. "Signature/Ratification Status Of The Treaty On The Prohibition Of Nuclear Weapons | ICAN". 2019. Icanw.Org. https://www.icanw.org/status-of-the-treaty-on-the-prohibition-of-nuclear-weapons/.
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12. Dulles, John Foster. 1954. "Policy for Security and Peace". Foreign Affairs 32: 353-364.
13. Waltz, Kenneth N. 1990. "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities". American Political Science Review 84 (3): 730-745. doi:10.2307/1962764.
14. Yost, David S. 2011. "The US Debate On NATO Nuclear Deterrence". International Affairs 87 (6): 1401-1438. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.01043.x.
15. Meyer, Paul, and Tom Sauer. 2018. "The Nuclear Ban Treaty: A Sign Of Global Impatience". Survival 60 (2): 61-72. doi:10.1080/00396338.2018.1448574.
16. Gibbons, Rebecca Davis. 2019. "Addressing The Nuclear Ban Treaty". The Washington Quarterly 42 (1): 27-40. doi:10.1080/0163660x.2019.1590080.
17. Sauer, Tom. 2017. "How Will NATO’S Non-Nuclear Members Handle The UN’S Ban On Nuclear Weapons?". Bulletin Of The Atomic Scientists 73 (3): 177-181. doi:10.1080/00963402.2017.1315039.
18. Fihn, Beatrice. 2017. "The Logic Of Banning Nuclear Weapons". Survival 59 (1): 43-50. doi:10.1080/00396338.2017.1282671.
19. Allison, Graham. "The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?" Atlantic, September 24, 2015.
20. Keegan, John, and Philippe Delmas. 1997. "War Ça Change: The End Of Great Power Conflict". Foreign Affairs 76 (3): 113. doi:10.2307/20048037.
21. Kugler, Jacek. 1984. "Terror Without Deterrence". Journal Of Conflict Resolution 28 (3): 470-506. doi:10.1177/0022002784028003005.
22. Colucci, Lamont. 2015. "GREAT POWER CONFLICT: Will It Return?". World Affairs 177 (5): 44-53.
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